Rage is not justice
The anger over the dog’s death is understandable. But when it is combined with distrust in the justice system, it risks turning social media into a courtroom and outrage into public lynching.
The video from Avliotes is disturbing. A dog is lying in the road, a car approaches, drives over the animal and then, a little later, drives away. The dog dies. The images naturally provoke anger and revulsion. And reactions on social media were, predictably, intense.
Yet on social media, the distance between anger and 'lynching' is dangerously short.
The 44-year-old driver was identified, arrested, brought before the prosecutor, and a case was filed against her. She denies that she acted deliberately. The case is therefore where it should be: in the hands of the justice system, which is called upon to assess the video and the other evidence and determine responsibility, intent and the legal characterisation of the act.
This does not mean indifference to the death of an animal, nor does it mean glossing over what we see. It means something elementary: in an organised society, conviction follows evidence and the judgment of the competent authorities, not a vote of outrage on Facebook.
There is, however, something deeper behind this outburst. The ease with which part of society takes it upon itself to dispense justice through social media is not unrelated to the low level of trust in the institutional administration of justice itself. When the perception has taken hold that proceedings are delayed, that responsibility is passed around, or that ultimately “no one is punished,” public anger attempts to fill the gap: to deliver a verdict here and now.
But distrust of the justice system, even when it has genuine grounds, cannot be remedied by replacing it. The answer to slow or inadequate justice cannot be instant condemnation by a digital crowd. It must be a demand for institutions that function more quickly, transparently and convincingly.
Otherwise, a dangerous vicious circle emerges: the less we trust the justice system, the more we take justice into our own hands; and the more we take justice into our own hands, the more we come to regard institutional judgment as unnecessary.
The protection of animals is a measure of a civilised society. So, too, is the rule of law. We can — and must — demand that the dog’s death be investigated thoroughly and, if responsibility is established, that the law be strictly enforced. That is a far cry from demanding the social destruction of a person before the justice system has even reached a verdict.
GIORGOS KATSAITIS
