Chrysida΄s lost spring

The explanation offered by DEYAK sounds reasonable. At the height of the tourist season, it is difficult to close the island's main road to South Corfu for weeks in order to replace part of the main Chrysida water pipeline. The traffic disruption would be considerable, and public opposition entirely predictable. Then again, to be fair, hours-long water outages every other day are hardly something that residents and visitors can simply shrug off.

The real question, however, is not about July. It is about February. Perhaps even earlier.

When, exactly, did it become clear that the pipeline had reached the end of its operational life? Had it been known for years that it was the weakest link in the water supply network, or did the need for its replacement emerge only recently?

If the problem had been known, then why was the winter—and the spring—allowed to pass without action? Why was the project not carried out when traffic was light and economic activity would not have suffered the disruption it faces today? If, on the other hand, the diagnosis was made only recently, the question becomes even more troubling: how is it possible that the condition of what is arguably the town's most critical water supply infrastructure had not been assessed in time?

The issue becomes even more compelling in light of another fact. For years, engineers have maintained that the permanent solution is to replace the pipeline from Chrysida to Analipsi, while also constructing a larger storage reservoir. That would ensure that minor failures no longer result in water cuts affecting entire neighbourhoods.

Yet, according to DEYAK, whenever funding is raised, the response from the relevant authorities is that the project is already included in the broader Corfu dams plan, presented four years ago as the definitive solution to the island's water problems.

Here we encounter a familiar Greek dysfunction. A project that is needed today is postponed because it is expected to be carried out tomorrow as part of a much larger scheme. The result is that the major project is delayed, while the smaller—but critical—one never gets done.

This is more than bureaucracy. It is institutional irrationality taken to an absurd extreme. Some infrastructure simply cannot wait for the completion of a grand master plan. The Chrysida pipeline is one of them.

An administration is judged not only by how effectively it repairs a failure once it occurs. It is judged above all by whether it makes use of the window of opportunity before the next one.

In the case of the Chrysida pipeline, the question is not why they are digging today.

It is why they did not dig when they should have—and when they could have.

GIORGOS KATSAITIS